For 53 days, Bolivia witnessed an intense struggle that reached insurrectionary proportions.

The movement demanded the resignation of President Rodrigo Paz, and might well have succeeded. Instead, it ended with the government declaring a state of emergency, the persecution of the movement’s leaders, and the continuing of the government’s program of capitalist austerity. What happened?

[Originally published on Marxist.com]

The movement began with a mobilization of peasants from the east of the country against Law 1720 (also known as the “land expropriation law”), which would have dispossessed small farmers’ land for the benefit of banks and large landowners. Peasants marched to La Paz, some walking over 1,000 kilometers, to demand the repeal of the law.

The government’s initial response was to attack and slander the peasants, whose march was due to reach the capital on May Day. The Bolivian Workers’ Confederation (COB) called a national leadership meeting in El Alto to discuss a list of demands to be put to the government and how to fight to secure them.

Radicalization

The COB leadership resolved to support the peasants’ demands against Law 1720 with a general strike accompanied by road blockades, and drew up a series of demands, such as respect for labour law and the constitution, and the defense of pensions, healthcare, and education, amongst others.

However, the list of demands grew to include the downfall of the government, pushing the leaders to lament “the rank and file have overwhelmed the leadership.”

Josué Cortéz is a photojournalist in La Paz who has been reporting on revolutionary movements in Bolivia for years. He told marxist.com this fight was different. “The movement at the start of last year was more fractured. If there was a teachers’ strike, only teachers would come out,” he said. “But for this people were everywhere. Especially when the cooperativistas came down. They are the ones who really started to twist the arm of the government.”

Peasants and precarious workers, particularly from the city of El Alto, set up formidable blockades that left La Paz almost completely cut off.

State repression radicalized their demands, including calls for the police and the army to join in solidarity with the movement.

The struggle against Supreme Decree 5503 (which removed fuel subsidies, changed labour laws, among other counterreforms) in early 2026 demonstrated the leaders of workers and peasants organisations were eager to reach an agreement with the government, regardless of the views of the rank and file.

In one instance, a “traitorous leader” was made to dance in a pollera in his village square by peasants angry at his capitulation.

 

By the early days of May, the bourgeoisie was forced to make a concession: the land expropriation law, which by this stage had been rejected by the vast majority of society, was repealed. However, this did not have the expected effect of appeasing the masses.

Faced with living proof that struggle yields results, and with memories of the premature capitulation in the fight against Supreme Decree 5503 still fresh in their minds, the movement took a step forward.

The will to fight evident in this movement was truly inspiring: the struggle had to be taken through to the end.

 

The most advanced sectors in El Alto promoted their own forms of grassroots organization through mass meetings (cabildos) held at various roadblocks and across several districts of the city. These were magnificent examples of the masses’ self-organization and democratic debate.

Stalemate

The roadblocks were highly effective, and various sectors moved ever closer to active struggle as outrage grew against the government, which was extremely weak. The government was unable to unleash repression, and concessions only emboldened the protesters. Rodrigo Paz was teetering more and more, but the coup de grâce failed to materialise. Despite the great determination to fight, the movement quickly became bogged down.

In a stalemate of this kind, where neither side is capable of taking a decisive step forward, the confrontation turns into a war of attrition. The bourgeoisie, having more resources, always has the upper hand.

Throughout the 53 days, the mobilised sectors showed great courage, and more could not have been demanded of them. But one key sector was conspicuously absent: the heavy battalions of the working class, mine and factory workers.

The movement lost momentum until the morning of June 19, when Paz’s government signed separate agreements with the mining unions of Huanuni and Colquiri. That very same day, with the COB’s mining backbone having withdrawn, its top leader, Mario Argollo, signed the capitulation to the government with tears in his eyes, leaving the peasant movement isolated.

The government declared a state of emergency the following morning, and all roadblocks were lifted within 24 hours, marking the defeat of the mobilization and paving the way for a backlash.

The government has persecuted and arrested a number of leaders in the weeks since, such as Vicente Salazar of the United Trade Union Federation of Peasant Workers of La Paz—Tupac Katari.

In turn, the defeat has readied the coming austerity program, which involves securing an IMF loan by liberalizing the exchange rate—a move that has led to a devaluation of the boliviano by more than 15% in less than a month. In effect, the purchasing power of workers’ wages is under direct attack. It would be no surprise if the ruling class tries to force through a land plan similar to the defeated Law 1720.

These are the real consequences of losing the class struggle.

But this defeat was not inevitable: victory was possible had there been bold leadership. Regrettably, this was not the case, particularly on the part of the COB. We’re left to wonder if this leadership was at all interested in seeing the movement triumph.

Meanwhile, the oligarchic vermin in Santa Cruz shouted themselves hoarse demanding a state of emergency, which they finally obtained once the movement had been exhausted and divided.

They even attempted to mobilize fascist gangs of declassed elements to destroy the blockades in San Julián, but these were overwhelmingly crushed by peasants and workers. This provides an answer to those on the left who fear we are facing a fascist or a strong government. Fascism comes to power relying on the violence of precisely this sort of group, and on its path to power destroys all elements of workers’ organization and even of bourgeois democracy. That is not the situation we are facing. Rather, we are in a scenario in which, under the pressure of the capitalist crisis, the mask of ‘freedom’ is slipping further and further from bourgeois democracy, revealing more and more the class domination it conceals.

The reasons for the defeat

The government lost the battle in San Julián, yet it ended up defeating the movement. Why?

The movement was dominated by the peasantry and the most impoverished and precarious sectors of El Alto—the sprawling working class municipality overlooking the capital. They cannot be blamed, as they demonstrated impressive tenacity and capacity for organisation. But many found themselves isolated without a program of clear tasks.

Josué Cortéz travelled with another local activist to a rural zone outside of La Paz blockaded by the Ponchos Rojos: one of the most militant organized peasant groups in Bolivia. “These people are very firm in their convictions and never back down. They are, as we might say, prepared to go all out and are willing to die for a cause,” Cortéz said. Here, the wasted energy of the revolutionary peasantry was clear:

We spoke to this gentleman whom my colleague had introduced me to—a leader of the Ponchos Rojos—and he told me they were willing to carry on, but the problem is their leaders. “As you can see, there are several of us here from different regions,” he told me (that is to say, in this case, municipalities from the Altiplano, Ayllus and so on) “but we don’t have a leader guiding us, and they’ve left us in the lurch. We’ve been holding the line for days and we don’t have anyone. There’s no leader to tell us, ‘This is what we’re going to do today,’ ‘this is what we’re going to do tomorrow,’ or ‘we’re going to carry on’—nothing. They’ve left us like this and we’re just waiting for instructions on what we’re going to do in the coming days.” Two days later, the COB made a deal with the government and, well, the whole thing fell through.

No movement can remain suspended in air, leaderless, without eventually stagnating. The entry of workers as a class into the movement was what lacked the most.

Faced with the deadlock, which occurred at a relatively early stage of the movement, it was clear that pressure needed to be stepped up. But against whom? With the peasantry on its own, a “countryside versus city” dynamic inevitably took hold, where some sectors believed the entire urban population should suffer shortages in order to join the struggle. This did not propel the movement forward.

Road blockades are a peasant method of struggle, and can be an extremely powerful auxiliary when carried out in conjunction with a workers’ strike. However, in isolation they are extremely limited at best, and can turn sections of the working class against the peasantry. Cortéz spoke about the opposition to the blockades from the working class itself, saying “the movement effectively split; even the left-wing activists who were there at the time split.”

The blockades undoubtedly made life more difficult for workers in the towns, but despite this, and the propaganda of the state, support remained from most sectors of the working class. “We felt it deeply here; it was 53 days and we really felt it. Everything was expensive, but those of us, at least those of us who, perhaps, stuck to a certain political line, held firm and said, ‘But this is for the greater good,’ and we had to, as we say, grit our teeth. But it doesn’t matter, because in the end, we can achieve things that benefit everyone.”

This conflict cannot remain forever though, especially as movement fails to advance. Sooner or later, even the most supportive workers will be forced to call for the commencement of everyday life.

This false “countryside versus city” perspective gave rise to truly bizarre situations, where roadblocks allowed mineral shipments from mining companies to pass through, but blocked the passage of food and gas destined for the cities.

What was needed to win?

A victorious movement would have led to the fall of Rodrigo Paz’s government, and in the absence of any other alternative, power would have fallen into the hands of the COB. But would it have known what to do? For this, it would have been necessary for the movement’s leaders to have a revolutionary perspective of nationalizing industry and running it under workers’ control. This is the perspective they lacked, despite their radical rhetoric.

The leaders of the COB were already under severe pressure from the rank and file after their capitulation in the fight against Decree 5503 at the beginning of the year. The pressure before May Day was even stronger, and the bureaucracy knew they had to do something. 

Instead of proposing a plan of action to prepare for a general strike, the COB leadership made a reckless decision: to call for an indefinite general strike until the government fell—a government with which it refused to negotiate with.

The reason for this crazy decision was the leadership’s fear of pressure from the rank and file. But in reality, although it appeared radical, this proposal (made without any preparation) laid the groundwork for defeat.

What should have been done was to develop a plan for escalating mobilizations leading up to a general strike, uniting the different sectors behind a platform of demands. By setting the overthrow of the government as the goal (when the conditions hadn’t been prepared) the leadership’s “radical” rhetoric led the movement into a dead end.

No key sectors of the working class ever participated in the movement: not the unionized miners, not the factory workers, and not the transport trades. Some CODs (departmental unions) in Santa Cruz and Cochabamba also did not support the call to strike. The cooperativistas (precarious miners) mobilized, but as we’ve explained before, this sector is dominated by the right-wing mining bosses and very quickly signed a deal with the state. They even helped the police dismantle peasant blockades.

The truth is the COB bureaucracy does not understand the course of the class struggle, and are incapable of envisaging the possibility of the working class leading society. They are absolutely and completely confined within the limits of capitalism, and are forced to rescue it.

But if the trade union leaders are blind, the Bolivian capitalists and their political representatives are a hundred times more so: from start to finish, they regarded the entire movement as the result of sinister manipulation by shadowy agents, be it Evo Morales, Mario Argollo, or Vicente Salazar. This is characteristic of the ruling class, which fails to recognise the agency of the oppressed classes, viewing them instead as mere drones who must fulfil their assigned role and follow orders. And if they rebel, it must obviously be because they are following someone else’s orders.

For the conservative reformist trade union leaders, every step forward taken by the movement is like edging closer to an unknown abyss. They fear that the masses will slip out of their control.

And so, the movement arrived at a contradiction: the government, extremely weak and discredited, could not govern. But the COB, the only organized mass organisation capable of taking power, refused to do so.

The state would have failed if they tried to enact the state of emergency in the first days of the movement when the masses were strongest. It would most likely have fanned the flames of the conflict and could have precipitated its own downfall. It needed the capitulation of the trade union and peasant leaders.

In the coming struggles, the masses will once again have to turn to their traditional organizations: the peasant federations, the FEJUVEs (neighborhood organizations), and the COB. There is no other viable alternative organization at present: the political route is currently closed off. We cannot dismiss these organizations, however much the betrayal of their leaders may disgust us. The masses must fight to transform them into genuine organs of struggle, and the first step in this is to fight to change their leadership. We need bold leaders who are genuinely prepared to fight against this government, which will spare no effort to impose its program of capitalist austerity.

All signs point to another mobilization in the future, even as early as this October. The leaders of the Túpac Katari and Bartolina Sisa organizations rejected the COB’s deal with the government and are currently discussing their next plans.

The defeat in June has had a demoralizing effect, especially when compared with what might have been possible.

The government has emerged victorious, but not necessarily strengthened. Its self-confidence has grown, but the problems that caused the uprising persist; indeed, they are getting worse. There is still no petrol, there are still no dollars, and the floating exchange rate is increasing instability for households. There is no way out for the masses within capitalism: only further impoverishment. This is precisely what guarantees that, in the not-too-distant future, the masses will once again be forced to rise up against their living conditions.

Capitalism worldwide is in an ever-deepening crisis, characterized by protectionism, wars that destroy fragile supply chains, an increasingly acute inter-imperialist conflict between China and the US that poses a particular threat to Latin America, and an economy teetering on the brink of a deep depression, with a wealth of factors that could trigger it. Bolivia depends on the export of raw materials. Its economy is deeply tied to the global market. It is also interconnected in terms of the class struggle. The mobilisation of the masses had an impact on struggles against far-right governments in Argentina, Chile and elsewhere. It is by no means out of the question that the tables could turn here.

Reformist solutions are no longer possible in this new era we are entering. Only the ruthless class struggle offers the possibility of any improvement. This lesson will be learnt the hard way, but sooner or later it will drive the masses back onto the path of struggle, because there is no other way.

If we want to ensure that next time does not end in defeat, we must take this central lesson to heart: the Bolivian masses do not lack the capacity to mobilize; they do not lack courage or the capacity to fight. What they lack is political leadership worthy of their heroism. It will not fall from the sky, and no one will build it for us, so we must redouble our efforts: history marches on and wastes nothing; we cannot be left behind.