In the days when American capitalism was ascendent, the capitalists didn’t really care whether the Democrats or Republicans were in power. Both parties were firmly under the control of a carefully constructed “establishment.” Both could be relied upon to responsibly manage the capitalist state, and they acted as de facto coalition partners.
The bourgeoisie had become so accustomed to their treasured political stability that they were thrown totally off balance by the 2016 election of Donald Trump. They had been blind to the immense discontent that had built up beneath the surface of society.
The Marxists explained what a profound shift this represented: the US ruling class had lost control of one of the main pillars of bourgeois rule. Trump—an egocentric outsider the capitalists could not rely upon or control—had taken over the Republican Party.
The capitalists regrouped around the Democratic Party, wincing through the chaos of Trump’s first term. But as the economy continued on its long-term trajectory of decline, Trump’s grip on the GOP only grew stronger.
Leading up to the 2024 election, certain layers of the capitalists started to reconcile themselves to Trumpism. Eight years into Trump’s political career, it became clear that no amount of media pressure, scaremongering, or court cases could curb his rise. The more the media attacked him, the stronger his image as an “anti-establishment” savior of America grew.
Wishful thinking
After Trump’s reelection, sections of the ruling class tried to “look at the positives.” Yale Business School professor Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, who networks on behalf of major American CEOs, wrote shortly before Trump’s inauguration:
CEOs recognize that there are many issues where their interests, and the interests of their companies, shareholders, and other stakeholders, are aligned with President Trump’s priorities. They hope to work collaboratively with Trump to bring these opportunities to fruition. For example, many business leaders have expressed enthusiasm for Trump’s pro–economic growth agenda, across tax cuts, deregulation, less stringent antitrust enforcement, positive incentives for onshoring manufacturing, and his pledge to bring down energy costs.
This wishful thinking didn’t last long. Wildcard moves like tariff threats against Canada and Mexico—America’s two largest trading partners—served as a painful reminder of Trump’s recklessness. A recent piece in the Financial Times details the rapid shift away from their prior delusions:
Trump’s election victory last November unleashed a wave of enthusiasm on both Wall Street and Main Street, with the dollar surging and stocks hitting record highs as investors bet on stronger economic growth, less regulation and lower taxes.
But there are indications that large swaths of corporate America are already beginning to sour on Trump … Executives worry that Trump’s import tariffs will hit their businesses, his crackdown on undocumented immigrants will worsen an already acute labour shortage, and his radical overhaul of government will severely disrupt the smooth functioning of the federal bureaucracy.
“The initial euphoria we saw in January over a pro-business president is giving way to consternation,” says Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, senior associate dean for leadership studies at the Yale School of Management.
In private conversations, some Wall Street executives go much further. One senior investment banker says the disorder and unpredictability of Trump’s actions—and those of Elon Musk, the billionaire Tesla chief who has become one of his most senior lieutenants—was greater than many business leaders had anticipated.
Conditions for revolution
Unfortunately for the capitalists, the Democratic Party is dealing with its own problems at the moment, battered after the 2024 election defeat with record high disapproval ratings. Politically, the ruling class has two bad options: an unprecedentedly brazen Donald Trump, or an unprecedentedly hated Democratic Party.
The situation brings to mind Lenin’s writings on the three major symptoms that a revolutionary situation is approaching:
1) When it is impossible for the ruling classes to maintain their rule without any change; when there is a crisis, in one form or another, among the “upper classes,” a crisis in the policy of the ruling class, leading to a fissure through which the discontent and indignation of the oppressed classes burst forth. For a revolution to take place, it is usually insufficient for “the lower classes not to want” to live in the old way; it is also necessary that “the upper classes should be unable” to live in the old way; 2) when the suffering and want of the oppressed classes have grown more acute than usual; 3) when, as a consequence of the above causes, there is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses, who uncomplainingly allow themselves to be robbed in “peace time,” but, in turbulent times, are drawn both by all the circumstances of the crisis and by the “upper classes” themselves into independent historical action.
We are certainly still at the beginning of the process. Due to the lack of a viable mass political alternative, the present political and economic crisis will drag out over years. But it is clear that the US ruling class is increasingly incapable of forming the kind of government it really needs.
As American imperialism declines, the “old way” of ruling—coasting on the basis of unchallenged global dominance—is untenable. Alongside this process, it is dawning on wide layers of the working class that the “stable” good old days of US capitalism are dead and buried, preparing the basis for a surge of open class struggle in the years ahead.